NEW CHRISTIAN

SEPT.-OCT. Edited by Kenneth Leslie

The Well Springs of Revelation

Editorial

"FROM BEYOND THE SEAS"

By James L. Brewer

MEDITATIONS ON "IKE" DAY

By Louise Harding

☆ ★ ☆

THE LIBRARY OF THE
NOV 2 - 1956
UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Vol. XII, No. 5 30 cents

MEDITATIONS RELATING TO "IKE" DAY.

By Louise Harding

Mr. Leonard Hall, Republican national chairman, having requested the people of these USA to celebrate October 13, the day before President Eisenhower's 66th birthday, as "Ike Day", the memory of your scribe has reverted to sundry events pertaining to the Second World War, with many of which this General was connected.

Background: Why Was Eisenhower Made Supreme Commander of Invasion Forces?

Here are a few references from Roosevelt and Hopkins, by Sherwood:—

P.262—Churchill maintained, in 1941, that the war was not one of vast armies, firing shells at one another. He maintained this stand after Pearl Harbor "and in the protracted and sometimes bitter arguments over General Marshall's plan to end the war in Europe by a frontal attack against the German armies in the West. It was certainly no fault of Churchill's that two American Expeditionary Forces went into France, north and south, in the summer of 1942."

P.393—Beaverbrook strongly opposed Churchill in this. He wrote Hopkins:—

"On my return from Russia in about the middle of October, 1941 I stated a case for a second front to help the Russians.

"I claimed that our military leaders had shown themselves consistently averse to take any offensive action . . .

"There is today only one military problem—how to help Russia. Yet on that issue the Chiefs of Staff content themselves with saying that nothing can be done. They point out the difficulties but made no suggestions for overcoming them.

"it is nonsense to say that we can do nothing for Russia. We can, as soon as we decide to sacrifice long-term projects and a general view of the war which, though still cherished, became completely obsolete on the day when Russia was attacked.

Russian resistance has given us new opportunities. has probably denuded Western Europe of German troops and prevented for the time being offensive action by the Axis in other theatres of possible operations . . . The Chiefs of Staff would have us wait until the last button has been sewn on the last gaiter before we launch an attack. They ignore the present opportunity . . . " If we do not help them now the Russians may collapse . . . (and) Hitler will concentrate all his forces against us in the West . . . "

P. 394 (Hopkins, in letter to Churchill October, 1941.) "There is still an amazing number of people here who do not want to help Russia and who don't seem to be able to pound into their thick heads the strategic importance of that front."

P.526—From London, April 1942, a memo. of Hopkins reads:—

" . . . Eden showed me a paper that had apparently been prepared by the soldiers about supplies to Russia after July 1. The memorandum clearly indicated that some of the military people here aren't too anxious to get supplies to Russia . . . "

(Documents subsequently captured show Nazi designs to make Britain a chief base of operations, the ablebodied inhabitants being deported to Germany as slave laborers.)

P.519—General Marshall, in accordance with the definite plan of the War Plans Division, sent the President a memo saying, "Western Europe has been selected as the theatre in which to stage the first great offensive of the United Powers because . . . "It is the only place in which a powerful offensive can be prepared and executed by the United Powers in the near future . . . Successful attack in this area will afford the maximum of support to the Russian front."

The invasion, later known as Sledgehammer", was slated to take place about Sept. 15, 1942. It was to be carried out if the situation

on the Russian front became desperate, and if the German situation in Western Europe grew to be critically weakened.

In London, Apr. 14, 1942, (p.535) Gen. Marshall spoke, "expressing the great relief that he and Hopkins felt that agreement had been reached on basic principles for a frontal assault on the enemy in Northern France in 1943 . . . Marshall spoke at some length of the possibility that they might be compelled to launch the emergency operation known as SLEDGEHAMMER, sometime before the autumn of 1942."

May 29, Molotov, in Washington, urged action on the second front, before Hitler became master of the continent. "The President then put to General Marshall the query whether developments were clear enough so that we could say to Mr. Stalin that we are preparing a second front. 'Yes,' replied the General. The President then authorized Mr. Molotov to inform Mr. Stalin that we expect the formation of a second front this year."

But by the early part of June, (p.583) "There was an increasing conviction in Washington that the British were now inclined to dissuade the Americans from entertaining any ideas of engaging the Germans in force on land or in the air in 1942."

June 7, the Nazis launched an all-out attack on Stalingrad. "It was evident that Sevastopol could not hold out much longer . . . Roosevelt and Hopkins asked Marshall and King what could be done. "There were a few men in authority—conspicuously Stimson and Marshall—who felt that too much of the strategic planning then going on in the White House was concerned with third and fourth fronts mentioned by Hopkins and not enough of the second." Churchill was bent on a North African operation. He spoke of the faces that he no longer saw when he looked about him in Commons ,and predicted that, with a landing in France, the Channel would be "a river of blood."

In London, July 22, Hopkins reported to the President that the discussions had come to complete stalemate. "Roosevelt was consequently informed that the British would not willingly go ahead with SLEDGEHAMMER." Hopkins, however, cabled Roosevelt: "I want you to know that Marshall and King pushed very hard for SLEDGEHAMMER."

In August, Churchill and Harriman met Stalin in Moscow. Churchill stated why he thought "Sledgehammer" should be postponed.

(P.617) "At every point Stalin took issue with a degree of bluntness almost amounting to insult. He made such remarks as—that you cannot win wars if you are afraid of the Germans and unwilling to take risks. He ended this phase of the discussion by stating abruptly he could not force us to action."

The next morning, Stalin was far from cordial. The Soviet Government, he showed, took no interest in a North-African landing. "He spoke caustically of the failure of the Western Allies to deliver the promised supplies to the Soviet Union. He spoke of the tremendous sacrifices that were being made to hold 280 German divisions on the Eastern Front. He said that he thought it would not be too difficult for the British and Americans to land six or eight divisions on the Cherbourg Peninsula. Churchill described in great detail the perils of an operation across the English Channel, but Stalin was unimpressed. It was at this point that Stalin made the observation that if the British infantry would only fight the Germans as the Russians had done—and indeed as the R.A.F. had done—it would not be so frightened of them."

At the Teheran Conference (end of November 1943), (p.791),

It is not a matter of record, but it is the testimony of some who were present at this conference that Stalin was told, unofficially (and not by Roosevelt) that the President would appoint Marshall to the OVERLORD command" (later name for the invasion of France) "and that Stalin made evident his conviction that no wiser or more reassuring choice could be made."

Sherwood says he was never able to find out why Eisenhower was substituted.

That U.S. military leaders, representing the country putting up the major share of the war effort, were convinced that a Second Front in France was possible in 1942, is shown in the brilliant work, "We Can Be Friends", by Carl Marzani. (P.153 Eisenhower's reaction to the British rejection is seen by the remark of his aide, Butcher: "Ike thought that Wednesday, July 22, 1942, could well go down as the blackest day in history, particularly if Russia is defeated in the big Boche drive now so alarmingly under way." (Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower.

"...it is a fact that at the time General Marshall and General Eisenhower did think the Second Front was feasible ... General Arnold (said) "in early 1942 the situation seemed to offer a golden opportunity for such a bold stroke." ... "The highest military German authority, Field Marshall von Runstedt, told the British military historian Liddell Hart ... 'I had over 3,000 miles of coastline to cover from the Italian frontier in the south to the German frontier in the north, and only 60 divisions with which to defend it. Most of them were low-grade divisions, and some of them were skeletons.' Adds Liddell Hart, '(That was an impossible proposition.' ... Said von Runstedt: 'I expected an invasion in 1943 ... for I thought you would take early advantage of this extensive stretching of the German forces in the West.' "

Regarding the shortage of landing craft, Marzani writes: "But the American military planners knew all about it. They know exactly the amount of landing craft available and they thought it was enough. The man who made the plans for the invasion was none other than General Eisenhower, then head of the War Plans Division. His plans had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff including General Marshall, General Arnold and Admiral King." Stimson wrote to Roosevelt condemning "the Navy's hoarding of landing barges for the Pacific ... On May 1, 1944, the U.S. Navy controlled 31,123 landing craft of which only eight percent was allotted to the Normandy invasion by the U.S."

In his Diaries (Mch 2, 1943) Goebbels quotes Goering: "He is also somewhat worried about our having pretty much stripped the West in order to bring things to a standstill in the East. One dreads to think what would happen if the English and the Americans were suddenly to attempt a landing."

March 18, 1943—"Goering can't understand why the English don't attack the Ruhr Valley without respite, for we have there a number of very dangerous bottlenecks ..."

September 10, 1943—"The Fuehrer is somewhat worried lest the English now attempt an invasion in the West. While we have very strong lines of fortifications, there is behind them nothing but a thin veil of reserves ..."

Eisenhower Denounced Churchill.

"The People Don't Know", by George Seldes, p. 97, quotes Eisenhower:—

> "Although I never heard him say so, I felt that the Prime Minister's real concern was possibly of a political rather than a military nature ... I did insist that as long as he argued the matter on military grounds alone I could not concede validity to his arguments."

Pgs. 67-8 Journalist Ralph Ingersoll expresses his opinion of the Churchill policy:—

> "The profitable percentage on Russian lives lay in the fact that the longer the Russians fought, the weaker the Russians would be at the end of the war and the better chance the British had, vis-a-vis the Russians in the postwar struggle for the domination of Europe."

(Or as we now know, the desire was to strengthen Monopoly Capitalism vs. Communism.)

To show that Stalin understood this desire, see "Behind Closed Doors: The Secret History of the Cold War," by Ellis M. Zacharias, Rear Admiral U.S.N. (Ret.) Pg. 77, the author speaks of an important document, the "confidential report of a prominent Polish diplomat from Mascow to his

Foreign Office in Warsaw. It described Stalin's frame of mind upon his return from the Potsdam Conference.

"Then, too, the news of the A-bomb was received and spread. Although he refrained from discussing the subject then, feigning studied indifference and disbelief, today we know that he resented deeply allied secrecy maintained around all that concerned the Manhattan Project. In his opinion this project should have been developed by all allies, and not merely their Western branch. 'Millions of Russian soldiers could have been saved from horrible death,' he was quoted as having said to our informant, 'had our American allies told us about the A-bomb. They pushed us into one offensive after another. Senseless offensives, now they appear to be. We could have waited behind our strong lines,without marching against the heavily fortfied inner lines of Germany, waiting for the atomic bomb to do to Germany what it did to Japan. But no! We were never told of that weapon! Don't you think,' he asked, 'that there was a calculated design behind all this? Was it not calculated to kill off as many of our soldiers and political workers as possible, preys of the Hitlerite beast? I think it was.'

"These thoughts deepened the developing anti-American sentiments in Stalin's mind. By the summer of 1945, that mind was soaked in suspicion and distrust."

No one can be surprised that Russia did not take this design with complacency, and their disgust was heightened by the conduct of the Hitlerites in Russia. See the Ciano Diaries, May 27, 1942:—

> "...Surrentino, on his return from Russia, gives his impressions and makes forecasts for the future. The first are not pleasant and the second not comforting. The brutality of the Germans, which has now reached the proportions of a continuing crime, stands out from his words so vividly and so movingly as to make one skeptical of its truthfulness. Massacres of entire populations, raping, killing of children—all this is a matter of daily occurrence. Against this there is the cold Bolshevik decision to resist and fight to the end, certain of victory..."

—The leaders of this Nazi campaign, be it remembered, are now the cherished allies in the great campaign for "democracy", "humanity" and "Christianity."

Thus far, in this article, we have seen how Britishers of the type of Churchill combatted Roosevelt's desire to help Russia as an ally against Hitler—in which the President was opposed by the "career diplomats" in the State Department. See "As He Saw It", by Elliott Roosevelt, p.p.204-205:—

> "You know," Father was saying,"...some of those career diplomats aren't in accord with what they know I think. They should be working for Winston. As a matter of fact, a lot of the time, they **are. Stop** to think of 'em: any number of 'em are convinced that the way for America to conduct its foreign policy is to find out what the British are doing, and then copy that."

—The truth is, these elements in State, as in Great Britain, were counter-revolutionary. Churchill showed this when he ordered the stacking of arms surrendered by the defeated Germans, in order to replace them in Nazi hands; he did this on suspicions —which turned out to be unjustified—that the victorious Russians would try to overrun Europe.

General Marshall was not willing to placate these elements. That Eisenhower was, and what came of his general tendency to conciliate, may be seen by a study of "Top Secret", by Reporter Ralph Ingersoll. Ingersoll, after serving as an officer in the American Army in 1943, finally became attached to Gen. Bradley's field headquarters as an observer. He did liaison work between the staffs of Bradley, Montgomery, and Eisenhower, and took part in many of the major events of the war.

His penetrating mind understood Eisenhower's character. He writes of "Ike":—

"Among the American generals, Eisenhower was immediately characterized by his shrewdness and his cold disinterest in anything but his job of serving both General Marshall and these strange new British characters who were molding his future . . . Eisenhower could take the battles that others were fighting in his stride, had no warm feelings to disturb him and could keep his eye always on the main chance.

"So, in Eisenhower, the British found the man they needed to handle hot political situations—and to stand off the more aggressive American field commanders for them . . . Eisenhower was by nature a conciliator and an arbitrator. At the time he even described himself as 'not a general really, but by nature a businessman.' "

Discussing the choice of American commander, Ingersoll quotes Hopkins:

"He said that Churchill was the problem—that Roosevelt had decided that we were entitled, and quite able, to run our own show but that the problem was to find a general who could 'stand up to Churchill'. He pictured Churchill as very strong minded on military matters and quite able to dominate his own generals.

"Hopkins gave it as his personal opinion that Marshall was the only man qualified . . . "

" . . . The invasion, (Hopkins) said, would be under American command, and the commander would probably be General Marshall himself, because 'he is the only general in the world whom Churchill is afraid of—when Churchill gets oratorical, Marshall just listens quietly and then brings the conversation back to earth with just that right facts and figures to destroy the P.M.'s case.'

. . . "Six weeks later, in December, at Teheran, it was not Marshall but Eisenhower who was made Supreme Allied Commander (American)—and all forces in the United Kingdom necessary for the assault, British and American (excepting only the strategic air forces), were placed under a comumittee of three Commanders-in-Chief (British)."

Discussing the 1944 invasion of France, Ingersoll writes (p.99):—

"General Eisenhower, of course, had nothing whatever to do with leading the invasion. Faithfully fulfilling the bargain made in Teheran, he backed up the powers of attorney he had given his three British Commanders-in-Chief. As the British had predicted —and they saw to it that their prediction was fulfilled—Eisenhower was almost wholly occupied in England with the statesman's part of the role of Supreme Commander. He visited the field forces for official inspections only."

(Discussing the divided command, the author explains that an amphibious operation is necessarily managed in that way. The commanding general "cannot add troops because there are no more boats to carry them. He cannot even subtract, for so interlaced are all elements of The Plan that the alteration of a single part of it will throw all the rest askew." Etc.)

After the expedition had landed, in the fall of 1944, two American armies and one British, raced for the German West Wall "against only scattered rear guard opposition:—

"There existed no German Army in the West as such. There were simply the unco-ordinated elements of a beaten force. The German High Command—and this was a vital factor in the case—was still in an extreme state of demoralization as a result of the executions ordered by Hitler after the attempt on his life . . . after the purging, no general felt he could trust his neighbor in the line, his seniors or his subordinates . . .

"The first reports of the generals lucky enough to be captured were right; the Germans had only one military objective in the West: to get back out of France, but fast . . . the fortifications of the West Wall . . . had no regular garrisons, were in many places incomplete,

and beyond the West Wall, Germany was wholly unorganized for defense."

A strained supply situation, Ingersoll says, hampered the forces in the field. The zone immediately behind the battle zone had three headquarters. No one seemed to be in general charge.

"This strained supply situation . . . had been foreseen, and Bradley had called on Eisenhower's headquarters to get him up what he had to have, no matter how. Had the supply forces in France had a better organization, the subsequent problem might never have developed."

After the breakthrough at St. Lo, July 25-28, Bradley's headquarters were at Verdun.

"We could look on the G-2 map and see the country ahead of the advance columns of both the First and Third Armies. There were gaps where there were no German troops at all—there was a battalion here and an officers' training camp there, but no divisions . . . Germany was wide open. They were pulling back out of Luxembourg, they were streaking towards the border in long disorganized columns. . . . "in the plans Section we knew that Bradley's plans were made to finish it in a month, in six weeks, in two months. And we knew that Eisenhower had Bradley's plans too, because we had seen Bradley off to take them to Eisenhower at Versailles, and later Eisenhower had come up to visit us, and our own officers had briefed him. . . . But the orders which might have put the Blueprint for Victory into operation and had been written—rewritten—and rewritten again—and still we could not get them back 'approved'.

"These were the awful weeks when The Great Opportunity passed the supply people by in Paris. To the staff officer, they were far and away the most awful in Europe. We had to watch the flying American columns grind to a halt, and one after another lose contact with the fleeing Germans for want of the gasoline to pursue them. We had to watch the war not get won . . .

"But there **was** time, as September began, to see what could be done with the single army that might be kept moving if **all** the supply facilities available were concentrated behind it. Bradley felt that now was the time to turn the whole West Wall position, quick, quick, quick, before the Germans could reorganize there . . .

"All these things were in Bradley's mind—and had been worked out on paper in the plans and appreciations his staff wrote for him to submit to his superior. All these things, and the sense that if the Germans were ever allowed to catch their breath it would all be different. The retreating Germans would halt and pull themselves together. The West Wall was there, in depth; if they could get themselves set in it it would be ten times worse than even the Bocage country had been. It would mean weeks running into months of grueling infantry attack. It would mean dead, dead, dead. Behind the West Wall, the Germans could maneuver their reserves. They would have time to raise new divisions, to move troops from the Eastern Front. In back of all the German effort was that straining to perfect the secret weapons which would make ours obsolete—to fit the submarines with their new devices, to get the jet planes and the V-1's and V-2's in mass production.

"In this situation, history called for a Supreme Allied Commander—not necessarily a brilliant one, but a bold and forceful man, making at least good horse sense. Such a commander would have believed in his victorious armies and their field commander. He would himself have seen that a single army could have been driven into Germany through the military chaos that was the Reichswehr then—as a whole army had been driven through the hole in the German line at St. Lo—and that such an army now, rammed home, could in a fortnight wholly destroy the usefulness

of both the West Wall and the Rhine as military obstacles and, capitalizing further on confusion, had at least an even chance of taking Berlin and forcing peace in another. Hitler's Nazi state was not merely brittle at the time; it was already cracked by the successive shocks of the attempt upon Hitler's life and the defeat in France.

"Hitler's commanders on the Eastern Front had seemed paralyzed throughout the battle of France. Their morale was low. The Russians were beating them at a bloody chess game on a monster scale, striking first in the north and then in the far south. A majority of German generals in the High Command were not merely willing but anxious to make peace with the Western Allies, to "save some of Germany from the Russians," about whom they had a very bad conscience and of whom they were very much afraid.

"The mythical Supreme Allied Commander who could have handled this situation would have had to have acted with great decisiveness and to have contributed an effective and inspirational leadership, at least to the supply troops under his command, to wring from them that extra 10 per cent in effort which was vital to a situation in which literally every five-gallon can of gasoline and every 75-mm. shell for the tank cannons counted. But no more than that was demanded of him; in the field he had a brilliant and successful commander in Bradley, and Bradley, in turn, had a savagely successful cavalry leader in Patton to carry out his plan.

"Perhaps General Eisenhower himself will some day answer the question why he failed to rise to this situation. I can testify to the fact that the opportunity was there, that its development had been foreseen since before Paris, and that by the beginning of September it was being argued to Eisenhower with all of Bradley's honest sincerity—and occasionally with the assistance of Patton's profane rhetoric and Hodges' plodding persistence . . ."

Montgomery also saw the opportunity, writes Ingersoll. His forces had been carried along on the left flank of the American First Army, but now wanted to head the drive to Berlin if Eisenhower would only allocate all the supplies to them. "To understand the flavor of the Anglo-American differences at this moment, you must recall that the land and air supply facilities at stake were almost exclusively American. Despite their short supply line, the British had barely enough transport to keep themselves in the field. The huge reserves were all American . . . the American divisions in the line . . . were adequate to the situation . . . In the air, the British had a huge fleet of American cargo planes . . .

"The year before the invasion the British had argued for the Balkan route into Europe; the Americans believed in the direct assault on Europe across the Channel. A similar difference of opinion had even then begun taking shape on the question of how Germany should be invaded. The British wanted to invade through the lowlands of Holland and across the Hamburg plains, striking at Berlin. The Americans believed in what was known as the Frankfurt corridor . . . American planners now felt that the German defense would be at its strongest on the northern plains, which were cut by big rivers and thousands of tiny waterways and which, while wonderfully flat, were so low that the ground was rarely solid enough to support heavy armored vehicles off the roads."

The Frankfurt gap was rocky; but here the West Wall was densest; Merz had to be conquered and the Moselle and the Saar must be crossed. However, in this location the Rhine was only half as wide as at its mouth; there were broad, unfortified valleys, firm footing for vehicles, strong chance of surprise, and great possibilities for strategic maneuver—the latter being entirely lacking in the north.

"Those of us who fought through the differences that had preceded the invasion were certain that British objectives were not strictly military but included political objectives as well. They

wanted Berlin and the north coast of Germany as insurance that in the event of the German collapse these should not fall into the hands of the Russians . . ."

"I believe that in August of 1944, a Supreme Allied Commander with the qualifications set down above could have ended the war by Christmas by decisively backing either Montgomery or Bradley. But there was no strong hand at the helm, no man in command. There was only a conference, presided over by a chairman—a shrewd, intelligent, tactful, careful chairman. This chairman had gotten his job as a result of a trade in which his chairmanship—with the title of Supreme Allied Commander thrown in—had been swapped for the real control of the situation by three Commanders-in-Chief . . . The man on whose shoulders the title of Supreme Allied Commander rested had been especially selected for his ability to conciliate, to see both points of view, to be above national interests—and to be neither bold nor decisive, and neither a leader nor a general. **The key to his original selection was the approval of Winston Churchill and the British Government.** They selected Eisenhower by the simple process of being in a position to veto the selection of any man who they felt might not be sympathetic to their point of view. Eisenhower was sympathetic and he got the job.

"In the situation which confronted him in August, 1944, with the German armies disintegrating in France and nothing behind them, General Eisenhower reacted as consistently with his character as any chemically pure reagent acts in a chemical formula. His job was to be cautious and open-minded—and he remained cautious and open-minded on the subject of what to do next while Paris fell and we pushed on to the German border. Early in August, he had answered Montgomery's demands by diverting transportation from the American to the British zone. He directed just enough to break Bradley's momentum without solving Montgomery's problem. By the end of August, the supply crisis had developed; after the military opportunity had passed, Eisenhower was at last convinced. He bet all the chips he had left —not on Bradley but on Montgomery, and too late.

From the supply dumps in England fifteen hundred tons a day of gas could be flown direct to Orleans, south of Paris, where it was "already well on its way to the front." "It was Eisenhower's decision to take all the priceless fuel at Orleans away from Bradley and his armies and to give it to the Allied Airborne Army, which now in turn he gave to Montgomery. The troops of the Allied Airborne Army . . . went with the supply facilities and were now Monty's to command. And finally, in addition, Montgomery got the full weight of the Allies' strategic aid forces to support his operation.

"Something like seven thousand tons a day were left for the supply of the two victorious American field armies . . . barely enough to keep the Third Army in the field at all! The five hundred tons of fuel a day diverted to Brussels alone cost Patton the mobility of three divisions. . . The troops of the newest American force—which were to become the Ninth Army—were, of course, completely stranded, all their transportation having rolled away up the coast to our allies."

In spite of all this, Montgomery sustained crushing defeat at Arnheim. The American field armies were unable to advance. "We knew by the first week in September," writes Ingersoll, "when Eisenhower took all the surplus ground transportation and the entire air lift away from the American armies, that the momentum had to go. Bradley had been licked—at the conference table. It was his first defeat."

"General Marshall, in his official report, credits the failure of the November offensive to bad weather. Bad weather wasn't the cause; later on, the American Armywas to prove it could win through much worse weather. What caused the failure was that the whole swing and drive of the American armies had been killed

when Eisenhower stopped them by taking away their only hope of keeping going—denied them the use of the surplus American truck companies and the huge air lift which went over at Arnheim."

The morale of the American troops began to drop. And Hitler, recovering from the shock of the attempt on his life, and finding that enough of his senior officers remained loyal to him so that he could make a stand, began a re-organization of his forces in the West. He created the Volkssturm (Home Guard)—the British had said this was not possible, although American Intelligence officers said it was. This Home Guard was put into the West Wall, "where a handful of professional non-coms could oranize the fire power of a regiment, safe within well-sited concrete gun emplacements."

Also, he emptied his convalescent hospitals and put together what the Germans called "Stomach Battalions" because most of these soldiers had stomach disorders. These troops were also put inside the bunkers of the West Wall. "When we fought in the West Wall, we lost on every casualty trade. When we attacked, our casualties were able-bodied young Americans, well armed, veteran and highly trained. The first waves were shot by men safe behind concrete and steel. When we took our losses and pressed on to blow up and capture these fortificaitons, we killed—or put into our prison cages—German farmers and cripples.

"General Bradley once estimated that by December the West Wall, thus defended, was worth the equivalent of **fifty** new divisions to the German Army. In a manner of speaking, these were SHAEF's Christmas present to the Reichswehr."

Hitler also formed the Volksgrenadiers; furthermore, the intensely-propagandized seventeenth-year-olds, just coming up, were given the latest, most magnificent equipment and comprised the Sixth SS Panzer Army—"and it was this army which, on the sixteenth of December, was to spearhead the attack in the Ardennes, with the support of the Volksgrenadier troops.

At the time Eisenhower was fumbling around with the decision as to whether to back Bradley or Montgomery, the Sixth SS Panzer Army did not exist, the **Volkssturm** and the **Volksgrenadiers** were home in their feather beds and the Stomach Battalions were minding their diets in convalescent hospitals. The Supreme Allied Commander's giving Hitler the chance to shuffle the reserve manpower of Germany, and to create the Sixth SS Panzer Army, was at least one excellent reason why we did not win the war by the Christmas of 1944."

Attack in the Ardennes.

There was delay in taking over the great port of Antwerp, from which the Germans had been forced. It was blocked by the heavily fortified island of Walcheren: the area was deep in the British zone, and Eisenhower ordered Montgomery to take Walcheren. Montgomery is said to have replied that it could not be done at that time of the year; he ignored Eisenhower's first order, and a second one. Bradley was still short of supplies. Finally, Eisenhower sent this message to the British Commander:—"You are a soldier and you are under my command. It is my understanding that a soldier's first obligation is to obey orders. I have ordered you to take Walcheren Island, and I shall expect you to take Walcheren Island." After two further minor postponements, Montgomery moved, and on November 9—two months after the fall of Antwerp —Welcheren was taken and the British Navy moved in to clear mines. "On the twenty-seventh of November, nearly three months after the port itself had been overrun, the first supply ships sailed up the estuary and Antwerp was open. To get Bradley the tonnages he needed, American supply people took over the running of the port, even though it was in the middle of the British area."

Bradley proposed to continue the attack. "Montgomery's delay at Walcheren, following hard on his defeat at Arnham, had again lost the British general the Supreme Commander's sympathy. So Eisenhower

let Bradley go ahead with his plans. It was the first of December."

Hitler's V-weapons had failed in preventing supplies from coming through from Antwerp. He was forced to move when he saw the American armies gathering opposite Aachen and in the south near the Saar. He ordered immediate action from the Sixth SS Pazer Army, which struck through the Ardennes. "It was a beautiful plan, and, if Bradley had given Hitler and von Rundstedt even another month to prepare for its execution, it might have worked." The Germans made an amazing breakthrough.

Bradley, says Ingersoll, conducted the battle magnificently. St. Vith and Bastogne were held, so that the Germans had but one trunk road west. Patton was on his way up to strike the first counterblow.

"And right in the middle of the battle, with the major decisions all made and the German neck well into the noose that Bradley was preparing, Eisenhower lost his nerve. He did not lose it all by himself. He lost it when his British advisers lost their nerve and when Montgomery panicked."

A message had come by liaison officer that the British would attack in the north. "But within twenty-four hours after this had been reported to us, we learned that the entire British Army was in retreat."

Montgomery formed a defensive semicircle around Antwerp, and demanded, from Churchill, from the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, and from Eisenhower himself in Paris, command of the American armies fighting between Montgomery and the Germans.

"In his dilmemma Eisenhower was surrounded by British advisers, and Montgomery was backed by the British Prime Minister himself. Under the pressure" (although, in response to Eisenhower's inquiry, Bradley had said he could hold the Germans) "the Supreme Commander gave way. Without waiting to study Bradley's situation further, he took the First and Ninth American Armies away from the American general and turned them over to Montgomery.

"The clearest case I have heard made for General Eisenhower is based on the fact that when he made his decision he was grievously misinformed as to the situation at the front... Even giving (the) story its full weight, what I cannot understand is why the Supreme Commander was so content to make such a momentous decision, risking the whole battle, on one-sided information. He was in telephone communication with General Bradley, and had been told the true situation but for reasons of his own chose to take the word of British Intelligence against the word of the American Commanding General."

The story above referred to, is that the Germans had captured the great supply dumps at Liege, (refueled, and continued on to the sea.—LH)

Stalin's Good Faith

Patton and Bradley drove through from the south, and the battle of the Ardennes was won—being, as Churchill admitted—an American battle; it was decided at Bastogne. The part that Russia played in this, is now forgotten by allied reactionaries. But see "We Can Be Friends", quoting Churchill's appeal to Stalin, January 6, 1945:—

"The battle in the West is very heavy and, at any time, large decisions may be called for from the Supreme Command. It is General Eisenhower's great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do, as this obviously affects all his and our major decisions. I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major Runssian offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere, during January, with any other points you may care to mention."

Stalin's reply, January 7th, read in part:

..."We are preparing an offensive, but at present the weather

does not favor our offensive. However, in view of the position of our Allies on the Western front, Headquarters of the Supreme Command has decided to complete the preparations at a forced pace and, disregarding the weather, to launch wide-scale offensive operations against the Germans all along the Central front not later than the second half of January..."

Mr. W. D. Pritt, eminent British attorney, writes of that campaign:—

"The offensive against the Germans on the Soviet-Carpathian front, planned for January 20, was advanced to the 12th. On that day, a great offensive was launched by the Soviet forces on a wide front, from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. One hundred and fifty Soviet divisions, supported by a large quantity of artillery and aircraft, broke through the German front and threw the German troops back many miles. Five or six days later, German troops on the Western front, among them the 5th and 6th Panzer Armies, had to be withdrawn from the front and transferred to the East to meet the attacking Soviet troops. The German offensive in the West was thus frustrated."

Churchill to Stalin, January 17th:—

"On behalf of His Majesty's Government and from the bottom of my heart, I offer you our thanks and congratulations on the immense assault you have launched upon the Eastern Front..."

Author Marzani writes:—

"It is worth emphasizing that only three days after Stalin's answer, and five days after Churchill's request, the Soviet Union launched a formidable offensive along a three thousand mile front. Military men know what a great achievement this was and at what cost. Furthermore this Soviet contribution was made without pressure for the Nazis couldn't possibly have won the war at that stage even if they had reached Antwerp. Hitler could not have inflicted a decisive defeat to the coalition, but he could have given the Allies in the West a severe set-back.

"If the Soviet Union had not been straightforward to the utmost degree, it could have taken things easy; it could have let the Allies receive a serious setback and then marched forward to take all the credit for itself. In view of Churchill's treacherous and double-dealing role on the Second Front, Soviet leaders had many grounds for dragging their feet. But they didn't. They fought honestly, loyally and beyond narrow nationalistic selfishness. No wonder Stimson wrote that they were 'magnificent allies.'

"Furthermore, it should be noted that the Soviet Union never made propaganda hay out of this episode. The public in England and America were not informed by their governments and the Soviet Union said nothing..."

Continuing the Ingersoll account:—

At the Malta Conference (January 1945) the British urged the northern, Hamburg route to Berlin. American planners from Washington saw there were plenty of troops left for a second effort through the Frankfurt gap. "The secondary effort through the Frankfort gap was approved,—and Ike was ordered to make it, in addition to the northern thrust."

"The extraordinary part about this story is that, despite this formal and unequivocal approval of at least a secondary effort through the Frankfurt gap, the conference at Malta had hardly broken up before the Supreme Commander, as we shall presently see, nullified it completely... In quick succession we were told, first, that Montgomery was to put on the grand finale, with the Ninth Army remaining under his command; second, that the role of the First Army was to be so limited and prescribed that it was as if it too were under Montgomery's operational direction. And, finally, we learned that the Third Army, already chewing into the West Wall on its way to the Frankfurt gap, was to be halted in its tracks.

"What happened between the decision of the Chiefs of Staff

Conference and General of the Army Eisenhower's decision to let the agreed-upon secondary effort go by the board? Again, one day, the General may tell us himself but the odds are that it was nothing more mysterious than an organized campaign on the part of his own staff to persuade him that a secondary effort was impossible with the resources at hand and that, therefore, he had no choice but to stop Bradley and flag Montgomery through. The reflection of this shows in the score of cables that passed through 12th Army Group, all illuminating a picture of dire British need for more troops, more specialized equipment, more supplies. The British put Ike under pressure and kept him there.

It is fair to General Eisenhower to add that the extent of the Russian victory, begun in mid-January, was still imperfectly appraised... Stalin ... placed so much emphasis on a warning that he could not continue the offensive after the spring thaws set in that both the British and the American Intelligence agencies discounted the whole show in advance.

"I am told that in Washington the War Department thought so little of the Russian prospects of victory that it was considered almost an even-money bet as to whether the Russians would break through the German line or quit cold and make peace with Hitler. In hindsight, this seems fantastic, but it is a logical successor to the military opinion in June, 1941, that the Russians wouldn't last six weeks."

Eisenhower's idea of the winter campaign, we read, was to dig in along the German borders, clearing the Rhine plains totally before attempting to cross. "Here the Washington planners disagreed with him on the need but not strongely enough to give him any orders to press on over the river."

Bradley saw all German divisions going eastward. Eisenhower's order had been, "you will undertake an aggressive defense"—in order, as Ingersoll says, to attract troops to the American front, so as to help Montgomery.

Taking advantage of the loophole offered by that word "aggressive", Hodges' First American Army crossed the Rhine on the Remagen bridge, and Patton went over below Frankfurt. Montgomery crossed two weeks later, but his tanks bogged down in the mud just beyond the Rhine. The American Ninth Army ran away from Montgomery's command, "forming the northern pincer of the most brilliant encirclement action won by either side during entire World War II—and probably in all military history."

After looking through the foregoing pages, shall we fall in with the notion of the propagandized masses, that "Ike" practically won the "Crusade in Europe" by himself (particularly as a great master of supply,) for which feat the nation owes him enduring gratitude? Or shall we see him as The Great Compromiser, elevated to a position of vast power and prestige because he was willing to collaborate with Winston Churchill in keeping the War going for two more years than was necessary, with loss of lives in the millions and material wealth beyond counting—all for the goal of keeping the British Empire together and helping the battle of Monopoly Capitalism vs. the Soviets?

Is it a heroic figure, or is it, again, the Compromiser, who declared, "emphatically", Sept. 11, 1956, regarding Suez:—

"I think this: We established the United Nations to abolish aggression, and I am not going to be a party to aggression if it is humanly possible to avoid it ... Now, if after all peaceful means are exhausted ... there is some kind of aggression on the part of Egypt against a peaceful use of the canal, you might say that we would recognize that Britain and France had no other recourse than to continue to use it even if they had to be more forceful than merely sailing through it."

—U.N. was not established to avoid war "if possible"! It was set up as a tribunal whereby war was absolutely to be prohibited; and those

who resorted to war, or to actions leading to war, were subject to the direst punishment.

It is NOT "aggression" for Egypt to nationalize the Canal through her territory, with offer to pay the market value to stockholders. Britain and France have NOT been forbidden transit—on the contrary, Egypt promises to run the Canal so that all may pass through. It is true, she quibbles about Israel; but she claims to be at war with Israel. Has the world forgotten how the principle of "freedom of the seas," established by international law, was trampled on by Britain during World War I, and how USA, whose great financiers, particularly Morgan, were backing Britain, acquiesced? "In war, the laws are silent"!

As to the now so much referred-to 1886 Convention, it was not made by an Egypt free to bargain: Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 and held on to that supposedly temporary arrangement until very recently.

During any possible war, free movement of ships through the Canal could not be guaranteed by any possible association of nations. A Bomb dropped through the air onto a heavily-laden ship, would settle all that for a very considerable period of time. The point seems to be, rather, that the great Capitalist nations do not want to encourage the general idea of Nationalization—especially of Oil!

In considering the Suez situation, our moralists might well have looked at home. In an interview appearing in S.F. Chronicle Apr. 14, 1950, William J. Donovan, prominent adherent of the Vatican State, former asst. U. S. District Attorney ,and one-time director of U. S. Strategic Services, said, speaking of "the external enemy, Communism."—

> "Cold war!" He repeated it almost with derision. "You've got a little word there—war. That's the important word. And if we're in a war, ethics are out. It isn't unethical to do anything to save your own life."

Napalm? Germ Warfare? Bombing of undefended villages? What are ethics and international law, where WE are involved Ask the William Donovans, now in control at Washington, in spite of hypocritical pretense.

FROM BEYOND THE SEAS?

By James L. Brewer

"The greatest issue of the times, man's hope probably, lies across the seas where one-half of the world's people are struggling to their feet from feudalism and colonialism . . . In the struggling twilight in which we are forced to live we cannot see that this is a historical period of institutional change when forgotten men are taking their fate in their own hands. In this momentous time all our democratic experience can inspire in us as a nation is the demand that other nations fall into the trap in which we are caught. In fighting our rear guard fight, doing what we can, long time is on the side of the democratic values, but the new tide will probably have to flow back to us from beyond the seas."

—Prof. Robert L. Lynd, Columbia University.

"Our great problems today are posited by a revolutionary world, and they can be solved only by a revolution in our thinking. Liberals should strive to solve them in a way relevant to history, not the American way, nor the Russian way, but the world way."

—Stringfellow Barr, author of "Let's Join the Human Race."

The challenging impact of an historic moment still awaits the answers of both candidates in the 1956 presidential elections. The challenge is: How shall that revolution-cradled USA accommodate itself to a world in travail of new revolutionary crisis?

Walter Lippmann has keenly appraised the major American political development as recognition by the two presidential candidates of "the dawn of a new epoch." Both calling themselves the "party of the future" the two parties have now to prove which is the more fit for the age that is opening up.

But there is, ominously, a fly in the ointment. That is, grimly, a lack of any impelling orientation as to what, forsooth, may be the viable future. "But neither party," says Lippmann, "has come anywhere near defining policies, much less a specific program for the new epoch." Says the AP analyst, "The degree of government intervention in economic processes seems the one fundamental issue remaining between the parties." This could well mean that foreign policy might be restricted to the "war on alien ideas."

Ex-President Hoover appeared as an importunate protagonist of this thesis. He proposed a simple brand-new declaration of principles, "a historic responsibility of the Republican Party in the face of alien ideas." "If you face the truth that we are in a critical battle to safeguard our nation and civilization, which, under God (sic) have brought us a life, today the greatest issue in America and for all mankind is the encroachment of the government to master our lives."

In special preamble to the Republican platform a list of idyllic principles enunciated by candidate Eisenhower, in evident deference to Mr. Hoover's potent voice, bluntly affirmed that, essentially "the individual is of supreme . . . under God (sic) we espouse the cause of freedom and justice for all mankind."

President Eisenhower's adulatory press hailed recent sentiment of his at the spring All-American Anniversary Conference in Panama: In a world in peril the dignity of the individual, his fundamental rights and the spiritual values of mankind are seriously threatened by totalitarian forces, alien to the traditions of our people and their institutions . . . Man, not the state, is master, a truth, that, if understood, would shake every communist nation to its foundation: for this is the new order of the world."

The president would confidently interpret the pioneer American revolution of political colonial emancipation as having prescribed a transcendent unchallengeable pattern of world social process regulation. He would disregard the commanding phenomenon, global in scale, of the revolutionary era of today, and the crucial fact that the primary American 1776 revolutionary purpose of political territorial emancipation, what with its accruing complement of democratic attainment, was a stage in the great human evolvement of society to a newer level of world adjustment on a social democratic basis.

John Maynard Keynes, the British economist, would dispose

of the Hoover-Eisenhower talk of the ruinous threat of government encroachment with the view that capitalism's free enterprise creed is definitely of economic monopolistic bent, not self-regulating, but requiring state regulation, while political power, becoming more and more widely diffused, effects an opposite trend in the political and economic fields, "so that eventually capitalism must give way to democratic socialism and democracy constantly extended in time and space."

Millennial Moonshine

One finds oneself fairly enthralled by the downright millennial fevvor of the candidates. Ike would glowingly claim that he is effecting an epic reformation and revitalization of his party to sweep it along to eminence as veritably the "party of the future." Thus by the use of his magic peace elixir he will not only bring peace "for all time, in our time" but he will also bring us "a brave and shining new world," a world, incidentally, with a coy nod to the labor movement, "in which back-breaking toil and long hours will not be necessary."

Adlai, holding his own and not to be out-pointed in the competition, grandiosely projects "a New America" to which he modestly adds, "We must dare to say again that the American cause is the cause of all mankind," and again, "We must launch a new program to meet the challenge of the vast social revolution that is sweeping the world, and turn the violent forces of change to the side of freedom." And again, "There must be a call to war against the poverty, the hunger, the nothingness of peoples' lives that draw them to the communists' false beacon."

Danger that there will be no vital improvement in foreign relations as the outcome of the campaign, whichever side wins, inheres in the blind-spot blight relating thereto on the part of both candidates.

Contrast the perspective of the President as to the prescriptive significance of the American revolutionary anti-colonial achievement in that it first proclaimed as eternal principle that man, not the state, is master, constituting an unalterable new order in the world, and the historical anti-colonial movement of today under revolutionary motivation of global scope as embodied in the late Bandung Asian African Anti-Colonial Conference of 39 nations, accredited as "the greatest event of the 20th century" and representing 1600 million of the world's inhabitants.

What shall we say of Adlai Stevenson with all his talk of "the vast social revolution that is sweeping the world", at the same time indulging the facile fallaciousness of denying communism a legitimate positive status as a proposed competitive answer to the challenge of the "nothingness of peoples" lives" under dominion of capitalism's system: an answer of persistent theoretical substance and of a long historical development!

While Stevenson calls for liberation for colonial servitudes he would equate with it a call for liberation from communist enslavement, closing his eyes to the evidence that the new colonial liberation movement is proceeding under stimulation of the communist revolutionary example.

Stevenson verily appears to be as obsessive in his anti-communism as the phobic Herbert Hoover. He has scorned the President for allowing the Geneva Peace Conference to become a propaganda opportunity for communism, giving respectability to the communist parties, an attack decried as unconscionably obstructive tactics in the arduous struggle towards the precarious goal of world peace and co-existence.

The genuinely revolutionary trend of this era has been well elucidated recently by the Labor Research Association:

"Economists used to study the world from the viewpoint of a handful of countries with the most advanced industry. Now they are forced to pay attention to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The people of the "underdeveloped' countries are making an upheaval which may transform world economic relations, and which the experts of the 'advanced' countries ignore only at their peril.

"The United Nations' World Economic Survey, 1955, said: 'Perhaps the most significent advance in the underdeveloped countries to date, however, lies not so much in the physical expansion of productive capacity, per capita, as in the evolution of a social climate favorable to economic development. The change in social philosophy, especially in countries which have only recently acquired national independence, is of revolutionary proportions.' "

In the face of all this our American bewilderment finds illustration in a recent column of Lippmann's in which he says, "The historians may well say . . . that under Eisenhower and because of his prestige with the American people, this country has learned to accept two momentous but unpalatable historic developments. One is the emergence of Red China as the leading power in Eastern Asia. The second is the recognition of Soviet Russia as the great power of the middle East . . . We are accepting them not with some long view of the realities of the future, but because we cannot think of any way to stop them . . . . . We do not have a policy which corresponds with the new situation and what we are really doing is to improvise and to muddle through." And he might have added that the Democratic candidate shows no more understanding of the situation.

The vital task of any American government at present is to make a foreign policy that will produce peace in the world and do away with the cold war. For the cold war must be renounced along with the fallacious idea of winning it behind sustained military threat: the "to stay free we must stay strong" guile. Peace and disarmament are imperative to end the bankruptcy waste corrosive inherent in the false front prosperity of war economy.

"World Awareness"

A profound exposition of the epic perspective in the world upheaval of this era marked the deliberations of a recent conference of educators and scholars on the topic of "World Awareness" at the University of Rochester.

Summing it up, editor Norman Cousins of the Saturday Review said, "We must comprehend the significance of our own history. Born in revolution, if we cannot understand the same language when used by other people we cannot understand the language of the 20th century." Dwelling on the importance in the world pattern today of the universal man he warned that "in world crisis, we may not deceive ourselves as to the world background, that moral leadership is the vital commodity of America in "convincing the majority of the world's people that we are ready to join the human race in giving evidence of our respect for them as human beings."

There are many witnesses, scholars and statesmen, to the acute necessity of abondoning the cold war. Here are a few:

India's Nehru deprecates the fact that there is today "too much thinking" that is "perverted by concepts of communism and anti-communism."

Edward Hallett Carr, Wilson Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, a British Foreign Office war adviser and a foremost authority on Russia, writing in 1945 of the "Soviet Impact on the Western World" said,

"The practice and example of the Soviet Union is a legitimate and pioneer extension of democracy's potentialities and a fertilizing factor, indeed, for the Western democracies which are in urgent need of reinforcements against the disintegrating forces inherent in the individualism known as private enterprise . . .

"The Western democracies must accept the Soviet Union as a democracy. The strong central government is a vehicle of majority will, and a shield against minority reaction. In our society today where the worker form a majority this idea takes the form of state power in the hands of the working class exercised by the workers for the benefit of all who work. Historically this is not an idea of dictatorship but simply the opposite of the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a small group of reactionaries, and the elimination of minority ownership of property and office."

In the *Nation* of Oct. 1, 1955, writing on the subject "Is There a Bourgeoisie? Dr. Carr said, "The essential fact about Soviet society is that it is a society of an expanding economy; and educational facilities, too, are expanding rapidly . . . So long as this goes on Soviet society and the ruling group will remain fluid, and we shall see further changes. Meanwhile we only confuse ourselves by attempting to equate the present regime in Russia with anything we have seen in the past, whether with a Czarist

autocracy or with a Victorian Bourgeoisie. It is *a new phenomenon in history,* with new merits and new vices, and *we had better try to see it for what it is.*"

Frederick L. Schuman, Professor of Government at Williams College, *(Nation, 8/11/56)* appraising the meaning of Stalinism, after a Russian study tour, finds a parallel in the condition of a people requiring an autocrat to avoid anarchy, such as happened in the time of Cromwell in England, Robespierre and Napoleon in France, Bismark in Germany and even Lincoln in America; and whether "modernization" could have come from gentle persuasion rather than by the brutalities of an atrocious tyranny is debatable, he says. However, he quotes Isaac Deutcher as arguing: "Stalinism as a program for modernizing Russia by weapons of Asiatic-Byzantine-Barbaric despotism fulfilled its historic mission, and was non-repetitive and a self-liquidating pheomenon."

Proceeding to today's conditions of minatory relations, East with West, but under nuclear war possible stalemate, Dr. Schuman says: "Peaceful co-existence is consequently synonomous survival."

He further advises: "The competition between creeds which will characterize the years before us will, I feel certain, be reciprocally stimulating and creative—if America will follow the lead of most of the rest of the 'Free World' in resolving to make it so instead of clinging to outmoded formulae of 'containment', 'massive retaliation and 'collective security' via alliances, embargoes and subversive propaganda. Soviet civilization is too flourishing and formidable to be disrupted by intrigue from abroad or damaged by foreign agitation or weakened by boycotts."

Corliss Lamont in his scholarly and objective work on "Soviet Civilization" says: "I could be wrong but in my opinion the objective verdict of coming generations will be that the Soviet Russians during their first 35 years laid the foundations of a great new civilization of enduring achievement with high promise of ranking in world historical significance with the outstanding civilizations of the past."

This is the great fact which neither Eisenhower nor Stevenson dares to face publicly, because it would mean that the apostles and beneficiaries of war had been defeated. It would mean that the ice age of the cold war was now definitely in the past.

How long before our spiritual climate will be de-glaciated of its hate and fear? Or must we wait for warmth "from beyond the seas"?

THE WELL SPRINGS OF REVELATION

EDITORIAL

Why should we whose concern is religion be concerned about political facts? Because political facts reflect human needs. And Jesus, whose religion we follow, was forever concerned with human needs. If the religion of Jesus had not been so concerned we doubt

very much that the world would have been moved to accept it and follow it. By "world" here we do not mean the world's exploiters, but rather the world's exploited. Jesus judged the nations by what they did to the dispossessed, the helpless, the children. Thus he would condemn a nation like Spain which starves and imprisons its children. Likewise Portugal. Both fascist nations. Nations like the USA which visited the children of Korea with death and torture by fire he must condemn. And the British and Canadians and other satellites of the USA may not escape condemnation, for all are guilty. We have tried to hide our guilt from ourselves, but every day it draws nearer to us and one day it will overtake us and confront us face to face. Our nation stands under condemnation and God is not mocked, even though many lift up their voices to mock him. God is not a thought or a dream. He is not an idea or a philosophy. He is a *living* God. And his life lives itself in the deeds of people who have cast out the thought of him; they have cast out the idea of him and think to have cast out him. But (laughter in Heaven!) it is he who is the caster out.

The well springs of revelation have for a long time now been shut up, abandoned, lost, gone under, making our lands into the image of an agricultural dust bowl and our towns like ghost mining towns. Revelation has been abandoned for all kinds of darkness, the lust of the mind, the lust of the senses, the lust for comfort, for fame, for power.

Take the word "perfection". It used to mean carried through, completed. As when Jesus said "It is finished." But in our false sense of the word it wasn't finished at all; it was just begun. It was a mess, an executed subversive, a few frightened followers, beaten, lonely, powerless, weaponless against the might of Rome. Jesus, however, believed he had done the work he felt he was appointed to do; he had fulfilled his destiny; he had perfected his work, and so he said "It is finished." He had the faith that he had well constructed the foundations of the real life which is to say the realm of God. He did not teach by general rules, but always by specific instances, each one different from all the rest, unique, individual, never to be repeated. His God was not an abstraction but a close comrade whose will be at times found it very hard to follow and whom he reproached for deserting him in his final hour! Was it not at that hour that God, the ground of our being, reached up, broke through the wall that separated him from this man Jesus, so that Jesus, now identified with God, was forced to loose God as a thing *outside* himself and to find God *as* himself? This was burden hard to be borne. It is the burden of all creative spirits. It is the revelation of God in man.

Today the revelation is revolution. It is political in form but religious in intent. For politics is not the ultimate substance of today's revolution. Politics is just the negative pre-requisite for this revolution. The real revolution will begin when the state begins to "wither away." That withering away of the state, foretold by

the Marxists, can only arrive with the burgeoning of the realm of God in the hearts of men; for men must become creators, must prove their kinship with the Creative Spirit of the world, before they can be released from the tutelage of the law which is embodied in the state and enforced by its police. All states today are police states. The encouraging thing is that most of them know it and are dissatisfied with it. The revolution today is not merely nationalistic. It is not merely economic. Profoundly it is the same revolution Jesus started long ago when he "perfected" his life and said "It is finished." With that life he rolled the snowball from the mountain top which has avalanched down the centuries into the Christian Revolution of today.

Do we then advocate anarchism? Was Jesus an anarchist? No, he did not *destroy* the law. He fulfilled it, or, rather, he filled it full to overflowing. That is the key to his attitude to the law. The law was the schoolmaster who kept the pupils after school as punishment; and he was the scholar who stayed of his own accord after school to slake his thirst for learning. He treated the law as a minimum requirement, beyond which we were to go so far that it became redundant. Those of God's realm were to recognize that the law is a mere approximation to justice whose operation is the work of love which can take account of only one act at a time, because each act is uniquely conditioned. Love could not lump men or acts into categories to which general rules applied. Law serves justice and therefore love, but only negatively, fencing off areas in which law can operate. As a servant of love in this negative fashion law slowly pushes forward the terrain in which man is free to be his creative unconstrained self. The two commandments, love God, love your neighbor, cannot be called laws in this sense. You cannot love to order, as you can refrain from theft to order or refuse to bear false witness to order. Love is not obeyed; it is "caught." It is responded to. Love does not command. It woos. It prostrates itself, it makes itself nothing before the beloved.

The economic man, capitalist or socialist, deals with men and their actions statistically. For him a man is not Ivan Popov or Elmer Jones, but a point on a graph. And a point is nothing. Even if his living standard is being raised, he is still nothing. They are working at this problem in socialist countries today. They will probably pass through this stage before we do. Krupskaya was the first Bolshevik to rebel against this statisticism. Those of our clergy who say the socialist peoples will never outgrow this stage have no faith in God nor in man being made in the image of God.

Nor have they faith in the work of Christ whose "perfection" they have turned into "the impossible", that which cannot be done, and which therefor need not be tried.

Jesus came to minister and told his followers to minister and we are all ministers, whether officially or not. The world was evil in the time of Jesus and the world is evil today. In the three short

years of his ministry Jesus, espousing the cause of the people and loved by the people, was hounded and hunted, knew no security, made no place for himself in the world, found no fame but only shame and death. Those today who minister as Jesus ministered will find themselves as he found himself, persecuted and maligned, they will find no security, no fame, but only shame and death. They will take insecurity to bed with them at night, they will go out each day tossing death lightly from hand to hand. The death they will find and the shame they will find will not matter, for they will know that the security, the fame of this world weigh nothing in the scale of integrity. They will know that it is not they who are the lonely, the frustrated, but the others who seek the things of this world, the big office, the title, the seat at the head of the table.

One proof of the work of the ministry, whether it is alive or dead, is: are the powers of this world, the organized empires of finance, able to use this ministry against the cause of the people? The ministry of Christ, insofar as it comes under the domination of money, is not a merely a dead ministry; it is a ministry of death.

The well springs of revelation are service of the people and of the people's cause. Not the idea of it, but it. Not theories explaining it, but it. We may go away and spend one, two three or four months of the summer on the shores of a lake or in a high mountain reading and renewing our communion with the great past, renewing the fellowship of the saints, drinking the well springs of revelation, but we shall learn more by carrying through in the valley of the heat and struggle of the world one act for the people and the people's cause. Once this has been seen and acted upon by the ministry of Christ, the well springs of revelation will flow clear and pure and sweet.

NEW CHRISTIAN

SEPT.-OCT. 1956

EDITOR
Kenneth Leslie

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Rev. John Tunnicliffe

EDITORIAL ADVISERS

Archbishop Adam
Rev. William T. Baird
Rev. Russell C. Barbour
Rev. Reginald H. Bass
Rev. C. Harrison Becker
Bishop Albert Bereczky
Henrietta Buckmaster
Rev. R. Alex Cameron
Rev. Boise Dent
Bishop Laszlo Dezsery
Rev. I Jonathan Domas
Rev. H. deM. DuBois
Rev. Merlin W. Ennis
Rev. Stanley Evans
Rev. John Fekete
Rev. Joseph F. Fletcher
Rev. Erwin A. Gaede
Rev. Sidney E. Harris
Rev. A. Eustace Haydon
Rev. Daniel Hughes
Rev. Hewlett Johnson
Rev. Imre Kadar
Rev. J. Spencer Kennard
Rev. Ferenc H. Kiss
John A. Lee
Rev. E. D. McGowan
Prof. John Macmurray
Rev. John A. Maynard
Rev. Laszlo Michnay
Rev. Joseph G. Moore
Rev. J. Murdock Palmer
Bishop John Peter
Ida Pruit
Leslie Roberts
Rev. R. Ross-Shannon
Watson Thomson
Bishop Lajos Veto
Rev. Wilfred Wakefield
Rev. Etienne Watts
Prof. Henry N. Wieman
Rev. Claude Williams
Rev. Mercer Wilson

NEW CHRISTIAN is published monthly by New Christian **Books**, Elmsdale, Nova Scotia. By subscription only. 12 issues $3.25. **Checks** and money orders payable to **New Christian Books. No Agents.**